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ABSTRACT 
Unemployment and earnings inequality have moved closely together in South Africa in recent 
years, suggesting that there may not be a trade-off between them as the literature generally 
suggests. This article explores the relationship between unemployment and earnings inequality in 
South Africa, specifically investigating the extent to which changes in unemployment can 
account for changes in earnings inequality. Decomposing overall income inequality by factor 
source shows the overwhelming importance of earnings in income inequality more generally. 
Decomposing earnings inequality by employment status reveals the centrality of unemployment 
in accounting for the level and trend of earnings inequality. The distribution of employment in 
the formal and informal sectors is found to be of lesser importance in explaining earnings 
inequality, as is wage dispersion within each of these categories. The findings point to the critical 
importance of reducing unemployment in South Africa if the extremely high levels of inequality 
are to be addressed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are a few countries more unequal than South Africa, and a few countries with higher 
rates of unemployment, but the combination of inequality and unemployment is almost uniquely 
high in South Africa. The levels and racialised character of both inequality and unemployment in 
South Africa are undoubtedly to a large extent a product of the country’s apartheid legacy, in 
terms of factors such as the distribution of wealth, the skills profile of the labour force, and the 
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highly capital-intense production structure. Both unemployment and inequality actually 
increased in the years following the demise of apartheid in 1994, although both appear to be 
falling slowly over the past few years. 
This article investigates particular aspects of earnings inequality in South Africa, focussing 
on the ways in which the rate of unemployment, the formal/informal composition of the 
employed, and wage dispersion amongst each of the formal and informal sectors contribute to 
earnings inequality. The methodology used to explore these questions could also be relevant to 
empirical analysis of other countries. 
Section 2 distils and critiques some insights and evidence from the international literature, 
as well as reviewing some key findings on the relationship between labour market factors and 
inequality from the South African literature. Section 3 briefly analyses salient aspects of the level 
and trends in earnings inequality in South Africa. A decomposition of income inequality by 
factor source, to determine the importance of earnings in overall income inequality, is discussed 
in section 4. The empirical analysis of the relationship between particular aspects of the labour 
market and earnings inequality is presented in Section 5. This analysis centres around static and 
dynamic decompositions of earnings inequality according to various labour market categories. 
Section 6 concludes and draws out some possible policy implications. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two main issues are addressed in the dominant literature on unemployment and inequality. 
The first of these is the way in which unemployment and inequality react to underlying changes 
in the economy (for example a trade or technological shock). A second major focus in the 
literature is the effects of changes in unemployment on income inequality. 
In terms of the first of these issues, there is a prominent view in the international literature 
that increases in unemployment and wage inequality are ‘alternative’ results of changes in the 
structure of the demand for labour. This could imply a trade-off between increasing income 
inequality (specifically wage inequality) and increasing unemployment.  
The notion of a trade-off between increasing income inequality and increasing 
unemployment has been considered to explain the differences in patterns of unemployment and 
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income or wage inequality when comparing the US and Europe, and to a lesser extent the US and 
Canada (see for example Storer and Van Audenrode (1998) and Ayala et al (2002)). Rates of 
unemployment tend to be lower in the US but wage dispersion considerably higher. Furthermore, 
in a dynamic sense adverse shocks tend to result predominantly in increases in wage dispersion 
in the US, but primarily in increases in unemployment in the comparator countries. 
Unemployment also tends to be of longer duration in Europe than in the US. Countries in which 
wage inequality increased the most have tended to have lower and less persistent unemployment  
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) summarise the ‘stylised facts’ emerging from the 
literature on the relationship between labour markets and inequality as follows. Firstly, countries 
with centralised bargaining systems (such as Germany or Sweden) have greater equality of 
earnings than do countries with less centralised bargaining systems (such as the US or Canada). 
Secondly, earnings inequality increased in the majority of industrial countries during the 1980s, 
but most in the US and UK and least in the Nordic countries. Thirdly, increases in demand for 
skilled labour and differences across countries in growth of supply of skilled workers explain a 
large part of the differences in trends in returns to education and experience. And fourthly, 
institutional constraints on wages limited the increases in inequality, more so in countries with 
stronger constraints.  
An adverse trade or technology shock may lead to some combination of lower wages in 
existing jobs; loss of some existing jobs and re-employment in lower-wage jobs; and/or loss of 
some existing jobs without replacement. Insofar as the jobs affected are disproportionately low-
wage jobs, any of these outcomes will tend to increase inequality. The particular combination of 
these three outcomes that an economy experiences in response to an adverse shock depends on 
various institutional features.   
In this type of approach in the literature, unemployment and inequality are essentially 
viewed as alternative equilibrating mechanisms to technological, trade, or other shocks that 
affect the relative demand for different types of labour. 
However, this apparent trade-off between increases in unemployment and inequality is not 
unidimensional or linear. There are also important exceptions, such as the UK in which wage 
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inequality widened yet unemployment remained high, whereas Germany has had relatively low 
wage inequality as well as unemployment. 
Furthermore, to the extent that unemployment is a structural macroeconomic problem, and 
particularly to the extent that it is a product of problems in macroeconomic management, it 
cannot be considered in narrow labour market terms or as a result of excessive wages. In addition 
to the fact that the solutions to unemployment are not necessarily to be found in the labour 
market, attempting to deal with unemployment purely in this realm is likely to heighten 
inequality.1  
The nature and extent of the perceived ‘trade-off’ between changes in unemployment and 
in inequality are also subject to policy interventions. The vulnerability of a country to a shock is 
affected by previous policy choices (for example, around financial and capital account 
liberalisation). In addition, the way in which a shock affects an economy is partially subject to 
policy mediation. The distributional impact of any exogenous shock is not predetermined. Even 
if the shock would have primarily or disproportionately affected low income-earners, some of 
these costs can be redistributed (through fiscal and other measures) such that the net impact on 
inequality is mitigated.2  
However, in the absence of specific measures to counteract this, a change in relative labour 
demand in which the demand for unskilled or low-skilled labour falls is indeed likely to result 
                                                 
1 As Glyn (1995) puts it,  
If substitutability [between skilled and unskilled labour] is not high then it is clear that the distributional implications of 
relying on wage flexibility are highly inegalitarian – the worse-paid sections of the population have to bear the cost of 
reducing unemployment via substantial cuts in their wages while the better-off sections of society benefit from the cheaper 
services. 
2 For instance, the effects of an adverse trade shock (in particular one that results in a reduction of demand for less 
skilled labour) on employment and distribution are subject to policy intervention in various ways. Firstly, even given 
lower costs of production of labour-intensive goods in other countries, the degree of import penetration of such 
goods in the home market is contingent on the trade regime and specifically on tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Secondly, industrial and other policies mediate the degree and nature of the impact of increased or potentially 
increased import penetration on domestic industry. Thirdly, skills levels are not static, especially in the medium- to 
long-term and changing the skills profile of the labour force would influence the results of the shock. Fourthly, the 
extent to which changes in relative labour demand actually translate into adverse distributional consequences is 
dependent on the distributional regime and subject to fiscal and other interventions. The fact that low-skilled labour 
may be directly affected by an adverse shock need not mean that this group actually bears the costs, although they 
are likely to do so unless there is specific intervention to the contrary.  
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either in higher rates of unemployment or in increased wage inequality, or more likely in a 
combination of these. The actual mix of increased unemployment and wage dispersion is likely 
to be mediated by institutional factors. These factors relates to labour market structure in 
particular, such as the bargaining system, the duration of contracts and of wage agreements, the 
system of unemployment benefits, a minimum wage, and so on.  
We identified a second relevant issue in the international literature as the effects of changes 
in unemployment on inequality. The international literature consistently finds a negative causal 
relationship between unemployment and inequality. Time-series analysis of the effects of 
unemployment on inequality within countries generally finds that increases in unemployment 
worsen income inequality.  
In their seminal paper, Blinder and Esaki (1978) find that unemployment has clear 
disequalising effects on income distribution in the US from 1947-1974. Reviewing the literature 
on the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and income distribution, Mocan (1999) 
concludes that ‘the consensus has been that income inequality is countercyclical in behaviour, 
i.e., increases in unemployment worsen the position of low-income groups.’ Mocan’s 
econometric analysis of US data over the period 1949-1994 indicates that an increase in 
structural unemployment reduces the income shares of the bottom three quintiles, and may do so 
for the second highest quintile as well, but is associated with an increase in the income share of 
the top quintile. 
Björklund (1991) finds that higher unemployment significantly raises the income share of 
the top quartile in Sweden between 1960 and 1973. In one of the few studies concerning 
developing countries, González and Menendez (2000) look at the effects of unemployment on 
labour income inequality in Argentina over the period 1991-1998. González and Menendez find 
that 43% of the total increase in inequality can be explained by the increase in unemployment. 
While the South African literature does not directly address the questions investigated here, 
several studies do find labour market factors to be important in explaining inequality. 
Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000) argue that increasing unemployment between 1991 
and 1996 contributed to increasing inequality. Trade liberalisation shifted the skills composition 
of the economy in favour of higher skills, which they suggest also raised inequality. 
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Leibbrandt et al (1996) use data derived from the (non-official) 1993 Living Standards 
Measurement Study Survey to decompose the Gini coefficient by income source. They find that 
wage and salary income is not only the most important income component but is also the 
component that contributes most to overall income inequality amongst African households. This 
is confirmed by Bhorat et al (1999), who apply the same technique to the 1995 Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES) for all households, and by Leite et al (2006) for the 1995 and 2000 
IES, although the magnitudes of the results vary somewhat.  
Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001) find labour market activities to be significant contributors 
to households’ movements into and out of poverty in the Kwazulu-Natal province. Specific 
labour market characteristics (number of persons in the household with jobs, and number of 
unemployed persons in the household) are found to be very important determinants of changes in 
adult equivalent income more broadly.  
Leite et al (2006) study post-Apartheid earnings inequality in South Africa and find several 
results germane to the relationship between labour markets and inequality. They decompose 
earnings inequality along various lines, including whether the person is an employee, self-
employed, or both. They find that between-group inequality according to these categories 
accounted for about 8.6% of inequality in 1997/1998, but this declines to zero or close to zero by 
2004. They also undertake the same decomposition in terms of occupation, finding about 40% of 
earnings inequality to be accounted for by inequality between occupations (and the remaining 
60% by inequality within occupations). Further, they find that increasing inequality within 
occupations contributed to the rise in earnings inequality between 1995 and 2004.  
Of the studies that consider the relationships between labour markets and inequality in 
South Africa, strong linkages are found. The South African literature does not however extend to 
the more recent data utilised in this study. Further, it does not directly address the issues 
investigated here, specifically in terms of quantifying the contribution of employment status as 
well as of the formal/informal structure of employment to earnings inequality. 
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3. INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
As background to the empirical analysis of the relationship between unemployment (and 
other aspects of labour force structure) and earnings inequality in section 5, here we empirically 
review some relevant aspects of inequality and unemployment in South Africa. We compare the 
levels of inequality and unemployment in South Africa to those found in other countries; 
summarise the level of earnings inequality in South Africa according to various measures; 
examine the changes in earnings across the earnings distribution spectrum for the recent period 
for which data is available; and consider recent trends in both earnings inequality and 
unemployment. 
3.1  International comparison 
To begin by contextualising inequality and unemployment in South Africa in an 
international context, figure 1 shows inequality and unemployment rates for 127 countries. 
Measurement and reporting is not uniform internationally and hence this data is not entirely 
comparable3, but they are at least indicative of international patterns. 
South Africa ranks among the most unequal countries in the world as well as amongst the 
countries with the highest rates of unemployment. Other countries with extremely high levels of 
unemployment include Iraq, Armenia, Namibia, some small islands such as Reunion and the 
Marshall Islands, and the West Bank. However, all of these countries or territories have lower 
levels of inequality than does South Africa. South Africa and Lesotho (the point on the chart 
close to South Africa) are the only countries with extremely high levels of both inequality and 
unemployment, and stand out clearly as outliers.  
                                                 
3 The observations are not from the same year for each country (as suitable surveys are generally not conducted 
annually and there is a lag in reporting results) but those shown here are the most recent for each country, restricted 
to those after 1995. Separate series are shown for each of  gross earnings; gross income; disposable income; and 
consumption or expenditure, with observations not being directly comparable across these series (for instance, as 
would be expected the measures for disposable income are typically below those for gross income, given that taxes 
tend to have an equalising impact).  
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3.2  Earnings inequality in South Africa 
Table 1 below summarises the current level of earnings inequality in South Africa, using 
several different measures of inequality.4 Earnings inequality is extremely high: for instance, the 
Gini coefficient of earnings amongst the employed is 0.63. 
Table 1: Earnings inequality in South Africa, 2007 
 All employed Full labour force All working age adults 
Gini coefficient 0.633 0.714 0.815 
Mean log deviation 1.739 3.986 6.597 
Theil index 0.803 1.051 1.485 
Half coefficient of variation squared 1.689 2.287 3.798 
Relative mean deviation 0.473 0.539 0.648 
Notes: 
‘All employed’ refers to all people classified as employed. ‘Full labour force’ refers to the employed and 
unemployed (official definition) aged between 15 and 65 inclusive. ‘All working age adults’ refers to everyone aged 
between 19 and 65 inclusive. The latter two categories include people receiving zero earnings; the measures of 
inequality shown here are calculated by imputing nominal earnings of R0.01 (+$0.001) per person per month for 
computational reasons. 
 
Earnings grew the most for those in about the lower third of the distribution, but excluding 
the lowest end, in recent years. Growth incidence curves of earnings in South Africa between 
2001 and 20075 are shown in figures 2 and 3. Surprisingly, earnings appear to have fallen in real 
terms for much of the upper half of the distribution. The top end of the distribution however 
benefited from earnings growth above that of the rest of the top half of the distribution. To the 
extent that there has been some ‘redistribution’ towards the lowest earners, the relative losers 
have been not the high income earners but the middle and upper-middle.  
                                                 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all data on earnings in South Africa is derived from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), a 
national biannual survey conducted by the country’s official statistics agency, Statistics South Africa. Appendix 1 
contains more information about the LFS and about the processing of the raw data to prepare it for this empirical 
analysis. 
5 Comparable data is unfortunately not available for earlier years. 
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Figure 2: Growth incidence curve of earnings, 2001-2007 
 
Notes: 
Growth incidence curve of earnings amongst the employed. 
2001 data inflated to 2007 prices using CPI. 
Curve smoothed into 25 bands. 
Note that the x-axis begins at around 10% since approximately a tenth of  
those classified as employed report zero earnings. 
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Figure 3: Growth incidence curve of earnings excl. zero-earners, 2001-2007 
 
Notes: 
Growth incidence curve of earnings amongst the employed. 
2001 data inflated to 2007 prices using CPI. 
Curve smoothed into 25 bands. 
 
These trends are surprising and challenge a common perception that those in the lower half 
of the earnings distribution fared relatively badly. There have not been significant shifts in the 
occupational composition of the employed during this period that might explain these changes in 
earnings distribution. Although a determination of the causal factors behind these changes is 
beyond the scope of this paper, one possible explanation is the gradual erosion of the earnings 
premium accruing to whites, with the possible exception of those at the top. The upper-middle 
parts of the earnings distribution are where most whites are located. Although whites still earn 
significantly more than blacks (even for similar types of jobs), this racial wage premium in the 
labour market is likely to be declining as the effects of apartheid become gradually less 
pronounced. The trends may also be related to changes in the premium to education, for instance 
a decline in the returns to completed secondary school education.  
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It is also worth noting that earnings growth is rather low relative to GDP growth. Real 
annual GDP growth averaged 4.52% during this period, which is significantly higher than the 
average annualised growth in earnings experienced in most of the earnings distribution. 
3.3  Trends in inequality and unemployment  
Both inequality and unemployment peaked in late 2002/early 2003 and have since been 
declining, although at a slow pace given their severity. Unemployment currently stands at 23.0% 
using the official definition, or 35.8% using the expanded definition.6 
A close relationship between unemployment and earnings inequality is evident from figure 
4 below, both among the labour force and among all ‘working age’ adults. However, these close 
relationships would be partially explained by the fact that higher unemployment means that a 
lower proportion of the labour force and of the working age adult population receive earnings 
and hence inequality would be higher in a straightforward ‘compositional’ sense.  
                                                 
6 The difference between the official and expanded definitions of unemployment is that the former excludes from the 
labour force people who have not looked for work or taken steps to start a business in the four weeks prior to the 
survey interview (‘discouraged job-seekers’). Both measures are limited to people between the ages of 15 and 65 
(inclusive) who did not have a job or business in the seven days prior to the interview and are available to take up 
work within two weeks of the interview. A person need only have ‘worked’ for an hour in the previous week to be 
classified as employed, and this ‘work’ includes activities such as helping unpaid in any household business; any 
work on the household’s land or looking after animals; any construction or major repair work on their home; or 
catching animals for household food. 
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Figure 4: Unemployment and earnings inequality, 2001-2007 
  Unemployment and labour force inequality   Unemployment and working age inequality 
Note: 
Labour force inequality refers to the inequality in earnings amongst all members of the labour force (employed and 
unemployed); working age inequality refers to earnings inequality among the population aged 19-65 (inclusive). 
Unemployment rates shown here are for official unemployment. 
 
Figure 5 below therefore shows the relationship between unemployment and earnings 
inequality amongst the employed only. These exclude the direct or compositional effect of 
unemployment on labour force or adult earnings inequality. There still appears to be a very clear 
positive relationship between unemployment and earnings inequality amongst the employed, 
with all four measures on inequality shown. As would be expected, the relationship is not as 
strong as with earnings inequality for the entire labour force or adult population. Nonetheless, the 
close positive relationship between unemployment and earnings inequality amongst the 
employed suggests that there is a relationship beyond the ‘compositional’ channel.  
It is remarkable how closely unemployment and earnings inequality have moved together 
over time, given that there is no a priori reason to expect that this would be the case. There is 
evidence from the international literature of a positive relationship between unemployment and 
income inequality, but this is not particularly surprising given that the unemployed are included 
in the measure of income inequality and their unemployment status would directly affect their 
income. What we find here, however, is a positive relationship between unemployment and 
earnings inequality amongst the employed. This goes against the idea of a trade-off between 
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unemployment and earnings inequality (at least for the period and over the range for which data 
is available). 
Figure 5: Unemployment and earnings inequality amongst the employed, 2001-2007 
  Gini   Theil 
  
  Mean log deviation   Relative mean deviation 
 
.6
3
.6
4
.6
5
.6
6
.6
7
In
eq
ua
lit
y
24
26
28
30
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
%
)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Unemployment rate (official) Earnings Inequality (Gini)
.7
5
.8
.8
5
.9
.9
5
In
eq
ua
lit
y
24
26
28
30
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
%
)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Unemployment rate (official) Earnings Inequality (Theil)
.4
7
.4
8
.4
9
.5
In
eq
ua
lit
y
24
26
28
30
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
%
)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Unemployment rate (official) Earnings Inequality (RMD)
1.
6
1.
8
2
2.
2
In
eq
ua
lit
y
24
26
28
30
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
%
)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Unemployment rate (official) Earnings Inequality (MLD)
15 
 
4. HOW MUCH DO EARNINGS FROM WORK EXPLAIN OF OVERALL 
INEQUALITY?  
While the focus of this article is on earnings inequality and specifically the extent to which 
various labour market factors account for earnings inequality, this section locates earnings 
inequality in the context of broader income inequality. 
Income from work (earnings) is central to South African households’ economic status. 
About a quarter of households receive no income from work, and the overall income per capita 
in these households is far lower than that of households that do receive some work income. 
Considering that the category of households receiving no income from work also includes 
wealthy white households whose members are retired, the low relative income of households 
receiving no work income is even starker. Table 2 below compares some pertinent descriptive 
statistics of households according to whether or not they receive any income from work. 
Table 2: Comparison between households receiving any and no income from work 
 Household receives  
income from work 
Household receives no  
income from work 
% of households 73% 26% 
% of individuals 72.5% 27.5% 
   
Mean income per capita R5 836.31 R2 861.88 
Median income per capita R24 820.13 R7 863.67 
   
Head of household African  (%) 74.8% 91.7% 
Head of household female  (%) 35.9% 63.3% 
 
We decompose total income inequality by factor source in order to determine the extent to 
which earnings inequality contributes to total income inequality. Data is sourced from the 2005 
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Income and Expenditure Survey (IES)7. The method follows Shorrocks (1982a) and Jenkins 
(1995). 
Define: 
μ as the mean income of the population;  
2σ  as the variance of income; 
yi as the income of individual i for i = 1,2, …n; 
yif as the income of individual i from source f where f = 1,2,…F, here F=6; 
such that ∑ =
f
iif yy ; 
fμ as the mean of income source f;  
2
fσ  as the variance of income source f. 
Then: 
μ
μφ ff ≡  is the share of source f in total income; 
Cf is the covariance between source f and total income; 
fρ  is the coefficient of correlation between source f and total income. 
And: 
2I  is the GE(2) measure of inequality, the squared coefficient of variation; 
fI 2  is the GE(2) measure of inequality for source f; 
fS as the absolute contribution of source f  to total inequality,  
such that ∑=
f
fSI 2 . 
Then: 
                                                 
7 This an official national survey conducted periodically by Statistics South Africa, that reports detailed income and 
expenditure data by household. 
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f
ff
f
f
φρ
=≡  is the proportionate contribution of source f to total 
inequality. Thus source f has a disequalising impact on total inequality if 0>fs , an equalising 
impact if 0>fs  and no impact on total inequality if 0=fs . 
The various income sources are grouped into the major categories shown in Table 3. The 
results are shown using three different methods of scaling household into per capita income (E1-
E3), as set out in Appendix 2.  
The key finding from the decomposition of income by factor source is the importance of 
income from work as the major driver of overall income inequality.8 Income from work accounts 
for 78-79% of total income inequality. This is not surprising, given the dominance of 
significance of income from work as an income source. However, due to the particular 
distribution of income from work, it accounts for an even higher proportion of total income 
inequality than its actual share in total income. 
                                                 
8 This finding is consistent with previous studies using earlier South African data, although the magnitudes of the 
results vary somewhat. Leibbrandt et al (1996) decompose the Gini coefficient of African income in 1993 by factor 
source, finding that 82.4% of income inequality is accounted for by wage income and income from self-employment 
accounts for an additional 7.7%. Bhorat et al (1999) apply the same methodology to the 1995 Income and 
Expenditure Survey, finding that 66.6% of total income inequality can be attributed to wage income and a further 
24.44% can be attributed to income from self-employment. Using the same 1995 dataset but an alternative 
decomposition of the Gini, the results of Leite et al (2006) indicate that 58.5% of the Gini is accounted for by wages 
and salaries, while five years later (using the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey) this had apparently risen to 
71.3%. 
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Table 3: Decomposition of income inequality by factor source 
            Share of income (%) Contribution to total inequality (%) 
Equivalence scale E1 E2 E3 E1 E2 E3 
Income from work  74.34 73.61 73.73 78.99 77.72 77.56 
Income from capital 1.16 1.10 1.10 2.84 2.69 2.74 
Pensions 2.62 2.37 2.37 1.23 1.05 1.06 
Welfare grants 6.11 6.87 6.84 -0.00 -0.17 -0.16 
Other income 6.27 6.65 6.54 8.95 11.08 11.06 
Imputed rent 9.49 9.41 9.42 7.99 7.65 7.75 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: 
Inequality is measured in terms of GE(2), half of the squared coefficient of variation. 
E1-E3 refer to three alternative equivalence scales used to convert household to per capita income; see Appendix 3 
for further details. E1 is simple household per capita scaling; E2 converts children into adult equivalents and also 
takes account of economies of scale; and E3 is based on the McClements equivalence scale and factors in the ages of 
children and economies of scale in a slightly more complex way. 
Income from work includes salaries, wages, and income from self-employment. 
Income from capital includes income from letting of fixed property; royalties; interest; and dividends. 
Pension includes pensions from previous employment and investment annuities from own investment. 
Welfare grants include old age pensions; disability grants; family and other allowances; and worker compensation 
funds. 
Other income includes a range of income sources such as alimony, hobbies, stokvels, food and clothing received, 
vehicle and property sales, gambling, lobola (dowry), and tax refunds. 
Imputed rent on own dwelling is calculated as 7% of the value of the dwelling per annum.  
5. DECOMPOSING THE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 
STRUCTURE ON EARNINGS INEQUALITY 
We investigate the effects of unemployment as well as of other selected dimensions of 
labour market structure on earnings inequality. This is undertaken through the decomposition of 
earnings inequality by population subgroups, where the subgroups are various categories of the 
labour market. The decomposition methodology is set out below, followed by the presentation of 
the static and then dynamic decompositions of earnings inequality. 
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Data availability restricts this analysis to earnings inequality.9 However, the importance of 
earnings inequality to income inequality established in the previous section suggests that this 
analysis has relevance to income inequality more broadly.  
5.1  Static decomposition of earnings inequality 
The use of decomposition analysis by population subgroups is well established in the field 
of inequality analysis. The intuition behind the decomposition of inequality by subgroups is to 
divide a population into discrete subgroups, with the partitioning on the basis of distinct and 
mutually exclusive personal or group characteristics, and to compute the inequality within and 
between each of these subgroups. 
The ‘between-groups’ component is calculated across the entire population and shows the 
differences in the mean of earnings (or whichever variable is being calculated) between the 
groups. This basically indicates how much inequality there would be, were there no inequality 
within each subgroup, i.e. if every member of that group received the mean earnings of the group 
such that inequalities between groups were the only source of inequality. The ‘within-groups’ 
inequality is a weighted sum of the inequality within each of the subgroups, and shows how 
much inequality there would be if there was no inequality between the groups. These two 
components sum to total inequality. 
We define: 
μ as the mean earnings of the population (with the population as defined in each 
decomposition below);  
yi as the earnings of individual i for i = 1,2, …n. 
 
                                                 
9 Decomposing total income inequality by labour market categories would require detailed information on each 
person’s income as well as labour market status. While the IES data used in the inequality decomposition by factor 
source (reported in section 4) provides detailed information on income, there are no questions dealing with labour 
market status of household members. On the other hand, there is no quantitative information in the LFS as to non-
earnings sources of income. This precludes decomposing overall income inequality by labour market status. 
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We partition the population into subgroups based on labour market status (as set out below for 
the various decompositions), with: 
Nk the subset of individuals in subgroup k;  
nk members of subgroup k; 
kμ  as the mean earnings of subgroup k;  
n
nk
k =ν  the proportion of the population in labour market subgroup k; 
μ
μλ kk =  the subgroup mean earnings relative to the aggregate population mean. 
Inequality (measured by mean log deviation) is then decomposed as follows: 
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In the initial analysis the two subgroups are the employed and the unemployed. The static 
decomposition of earnings inequality presented here indicates how much of earnings inequality 
can be accounted for by the fact that the employed receive earnings and the unemployed do not, 
and how much can be accounted for by inequality in earnings amongst the employed.10   
Given the way that the decompositions are set up here, the within-groups component 
essentially measures the relative importance of inequality amongst the employed. The between-
groups component basically measures how much of earnings inequality is explained by the 
difference between the mean earnings of those employed with the zero earnings11 of those not 
working. 
The results are shown in Table 4. The populations in the three decompositions shown here 
are the labour force (each of the official and expended definitions) and the working age adult 
population (between the ages of 19 and 65 inclusive). For the labour force, the two groups are 
the employed and the unemployed; while in the analysis of working age adults the two groups 
                                                 
10 All static decompositions of inequality are based on the September 2007 LFS. 
11 Actually, the imputed earnings of R0.01 per month for computational purposes. 
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are those working and those not working (i.e. including both the unemployed and those outside 
of the labour force) between aged 19 and 65 inclusive. 
The between- and within-groups components of inequality are converted to a percentage 
basis for ease of interpretation. That is, the between-groups figure is shown as  
0
1ln100
I
k k
k∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
λν
 
indicating how much of earnings inequality is explained by inequality between the employed and 
the unemployed; while the within-groups figure 
0
0100
I
I
k
k
k∑ν
 shows how much of total inequality 
is explained by inequality amongst the employed. 
Table 4: Static decomposition of current earnings inequality by employment status (%) 
 Between-groups Within-groups Total 
Labour force – official definition 67.59 32.41 100 
Labour force – expanded definition 79.44 20.56 100 
Working age adults 87.62 12.38 100 
 
A key finding from this part of the analysis is the importance of between-group inequality 
in accounting for earnings inequality (among the labour force or among the working age 
population). As would be expected, the relative importance of between-group inequality rises as 
the population being analysed expands, since the proportion of non-earners within the sample 
increases. The contribution of earnings inequality within the employed to broader earnings 
inequality – shown here by the within-groups component – ranges between 12% for the working-
age adult population and 32% for the labour force (as officially defined). This contribution is 
driven by the fact that approximately 10% of the ‘employed’ earn nothing, by the prevalence of 
the ‘working poor’, and by the high degree of earnings inequality amongst the employed more 
broadly. 
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Next, we subdivide those working into two categories: those employed in the formal 
sector, and those employed in the informal sector (including domestic workers).12 This 
investigates the impact of not only the rate of unemployment but also of this aspect of 
employment structure on earnings inequality. 
To contextualise the decomposition analysis that follows, table 5 below compares the 
distribution of earnings in the formal and informal sectors as well as the unemployed. 90% of 
earnings go to people employed in the formal sector. Surprisingly, inequality of earnings is 
roughly similar between the formal and informal sectors.13  
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of current earnings inequality by labour market status 
 Formally employed Informally employed Unemployed 
Population share 56.3% 20.6% 23.1% 
Earnings share 90.9% 9.1% 0% 
    
Gini 0.59 0.57 0 
Mean log deviation  1.49 1.56 0 
 
Earnings inequality is decomposed according to labour market status with the groups being 
the formally employed, the informally employed, and the unemployed or not working; the results 
are summarised in table 6. The between-groups component is found to be more important here in 
accounting for overall earnings inequality than in the previous decompositions (where all the 
employed were treated as a single group), as would be expected given the higher level of 
disaggregation used here. This is probably because the levels of inequality are similar within 
                                                 
12 The categorisation of the formal and informal sectors used in this analysis is based on the definitions used by Stats 
SA. The allocation of LFS respondents to the formal or informal sector is based on their own response as to whether 
their employer is in the formal or informal sector. The explanation/prompting provided in the LFS questionnaire 
specifies that ‘formal sector employment is where the employer (institution, business or private individual) is 
registered perform the activity. Informal sector employment is where the employer is not registered.’ (Statistics 
South Africa 2008b). 
13 Earnings inequality measured by the Gini coefficient and by mean log deviation; it is also approximately equal 
between the formal and informal sectors when other measures of inequality are used. 
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each of the formal and informal sectors, but average earnings are significantly higher in the 
formal sector than the informal.  
Table 6: Static decomposition of earnings inequality by labour market category 
 Between-groups Within-groups Total 
Labour force – official definition 70.77 29.23 100 
Labour force – expanded definition 81.66 18.34 100 
Working age adults 88.89 11.11 100 
Note: 
The groups in this decomposition are the formally employed, informally employed, and the unemployed in the cases 
where the reference population is the labour force; and the formally employed, informally employed, and those not 
working where the reference population is the working age adult population. 
 
The level of wage dispersion within each of the formal and informal sectors does 
contribute to overall earnings inequality. But of greater importance are the gaps between the 
average earnings of the formal and informal sectors and between these and the zero earnings 
received by the unemployed. These findings might suggest that reducing the rate of 
unemployment, as well as closing the gap between formal and informal sector earnings or 
moving people from the informal to formal sectors, would be central to reducing the overall level 
of earnings inequality. Reducing earnings dispersion within each of the formal and informal 
sectors is of lesser importance in this regard. 
5.2  Dynamic decomposition of earnings inequality 
We use a dynamic decomposition methodology to analyse the changes in earnings 
inequality between 2001 and 2007, in order to explain how much of these changes can be 
accounted for by changes in the various aspects of labour market structure. That is, we seek to 
identify how much of the changes in earnings inequality can be accounted for by changes in 
factors such as unemployment, earnings dispersion amongst the employed, and differences in 
earnings between the formal and informal sectors. 
In the dynamic decomposition we follow the method pioneered by Mookherjee and 
Shorrocks (1982) for the analysis of trends in income inequality in the UK. Following on from 
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the method for the static decomposition of inequality set out in the previous section, further 
define: 
( )1
2
1 ++= tktkk ννν  for time periods t and t+1. 
Similarly for kI0 and kλlog . 
Then the change in the mean log deviation measure of inequality can be decomposed as follows: 
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As with the static decompositions of inequality for 2007 set out in the previous section, we 
begin with a simple decomposition of inequality into just two groups: the employed and the 
unemployed.  
We show the decomposition of changes in two periods: the episode in which both 
unemployment and inequality were increasing (first half of 2001 to second half of 2002) and the 
episode in which both were falling (the second half of 2002 to the second half of 2007). 
Applying the decomposition to these two periods separately avoids the high degree of volatility 
between individual years or between the biannual surveys, while also picking up the potentially 
different dynamics of these two distinct periods rather than mixing them together.14 
The results are shown in Tables 7 and 8 (using the official and expanded definitions of 
unemployment respectively), in percentage form. That is, the effect of changes in earnings 
inequality is shown as 
o
k
k
k
I
I
Δ
Δ∑ 0100 ν
; the effect of changes in the rate of unemployment15 is 
                                                 
14 Period 1 in particular is unfortunately shorter than would be desirable, but this is limited by data availability. 
15 In general, this would be the effect of changes in the proportions employed and unemployed, which amounts to 
the unemployment rate since the population here is the labour force. 
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shown as 
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; and the effect of changes in between-group 
inequality (i.e. the relative income of subgroups) as 
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sum to 100% in the first period and -100% in the second period, since inequality rose in the first 
period and fell in the second.  
The most important result arising from this analysis is the importance of changes in the 
unemployment rate in explaining changes in earnings inequality within the labour force. During 
the first period, in which both unemployment and inequality rose, increases in the unemployment 
rate accounted for just over 72% of the increase in earnings inequality within the labour force. 
Both unemployment and inequality fell during the second period, and the decrease in the 
unemployment rate similarly explained just under 72% of the decrease in inequality. This finding 
highlights the huge importance of the unemployment rate in explaining earnings inequality. 
Inequality amongst earners contributed to a small extent to the increase in inequality 
amongst the entire labour force in the first period, and to a somewhat larger extent to the 
decrease in inequality in the second. It is interesting that inequality amongst earners moved in the 
same direction as trends in overall labour force inequality as well as in the unemployment rate, in 
both periods.  
The third component of the decomposition is changes in between-group inequality, that is, 
the effect of the change in relative mean earnings of the employed and unemployed on changes 
in overall earnings inequality of the labour force and is essentially a residual factor in this 
decomposition. This is the only component with the same sign in the two periods, meaning that it 
contributed to the rise in inequality in the first period and mitigated the fall in inequality in the 
second period.  
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Table 7: Periodised results from dynamic decomposition of earnings inequality by 
employment/unemployment [official definition] (%) 
 Period 1 Period 2 
 (2001-1 - 2002-2) (2002-2 - 2007-2) 
Effect of changes in earnings inequality 14.6 -35.8 
Effect of changes in unemployment rate 72.1 -71.8 
Effect of changes in between-group inequality 13.2 7.7 
Total 100 -100 
 
Table 8: Periodised results from dynamic decomposition of earnings inequality by 
employment/unemployment [expanded definition] (%) 
 Period 1 Period 2 
 (2001-1 - 2002-2) (2002-2 - 2007-2) 
Effect of changes in earnings inequality 11.0 -40.0 
Effect of changes in unemployment rate 72.6 -74.9 
Effect of changes in between-group inequality 16.4 14.9 
Total 100 -100 
 
As with the static decomposition, we extend this analysis by subdividing the employed into 
those working in the formal sector and those working in the informal sector. The changes in 
labour force earnings inequality between 2001 and 2007 are decomposed according to three 
subgroups: the formally employed, the informally employed, and the unemployed. 
These results, summarised in Tables 9 and 10, reinforce those from the dynamic 
decomposition into employed and unemployed discussed above. The most important factor 
explaining both the increase in inequality in the first period and the fall in inequality in the 
second, is changes in labour force structure in terms of the proportions of the labour force that 
are employed in the formal sector, employed in the informal sector, and unemployed 
respectively.  
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Table 9: Periodised results from dynamic decomposition of earnings inequality by formal 
employment/informal employment/unemployment [official definition] 
 Period 1 Period 2 
 (2001-1 - 2002-2) (2002-2 - 2007-2) 
Effect of changes in earnings inequality 21.5 -31.7 
Effect of changes in proportions formally employed / 
informally employed / unemployed 62.5 -71.1 
Effect of changes in between-group inequality 15.9 2.8 
Total 100 -100 
 
Table 10: Periodised results from dynamic decomposition of earnings inequality by formal 
employment/informal employment/unemployment [expanded definition] 
 Period 1 Period 2 
 (2001-1 - 2002-2) (2002-2 - 2007-2) 
Effect of changes in earnings inequality 16.3 -35.3 
Effect of changes in proportions formally employed / 
informally employed / unemployed 67.5 -73.6 
Effect of changes in between-group inequality 16.2 8.9 
Total 100 -100 
 
6.  DISCUSSION 
Our empirical investigation points to the centrality of unemployment to the understanding 
of inequality in South Africa. The decomposition of overall income inequality by factor source 
showed that earnings from work account for most of total income, and the inequality in 
households’ receipt of earnings from work account for almost 80% of overall income inequality.  
We also observe a surprisingly close relationship between the trends in unemployment and 
in earnings inequality amongst the employed over time. This is interesting in that it suggests that 
– at least for the period under review and within the ranges of inequality and unemployment 
during that period – there might not be a trade-off between inequality and unemployment, as the 
dominant international literature would expect. 
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The relevance of unemployment to inequality is underscored by the results from the static 
and dynamic decomposition analyses of earnings inequality. The rate of unemployment was 
found to account for the bulk of earnings inequality. Further, changes in unemployment account 
for most of the changes in inequality, both during the rise in inequality up to late 2002 and 
during the subsequent decline.  
These results could suggest that rather than there being a trade-off between reducing 
unemployment and reducing inequality, similar policies might be able to address both of these. 
Furthermore, addressing the crisis of unemployment is vital if South Africa’s extremely high 
levels of inequality are to be reduced. A shift in the growth path in which the relative and 
absolute demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour increased could bring down both 
unemployment and inequality. 
Of course, the finding of the relationship between unemployment and inequality – and the 
implication that there is not necessarily a trade-off in addressing these – might not necessarily 
hold for values of unemployment and inequality outside of the range analysed here with the data 
which is available. That is, there may indeed be a trade-off between unemployment and 
inequality at lower levels of inequality and/or unemployment.  
Earnings dispersion amongst the employed as well as the proportions of people in the 
formal and informal sectors, are also important albeit lesser contributors to inequality among the 
labour force and among working age adults. Having established the centrality of addressing 
unemployment in order to address inequality, we also cannot say that just ‘any jobs’ would really 
be a solution to the problem of high levels of inequality in South Africa, even if these jobs are 
very badly paid. An increase in the dispersion of earnings amongst the employed, or an 
informalisation of employment, would tend to worsen inequality. A massive expansion of decent 
employment opportunities, particularly for the low-skilled and semi-skilled, could be the most 
important means of bringing down overall inequality in South Africa.  
Dramatic improvements in distribution rarely come about without active measures targeted 
specifically at lessening inequality. Moderate decreases in inequality may well come about as a 
by-product of other dynamics. However, the magnitude of the reduction in inequality that would 
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be required to bring South Africa anywhere in line with international norms is not going to 
happen without policies dedicated to that end. 
The most important dynamic underlying future distributional changes is likely to be 
through the labour market, in terms of both employment creation (or losses) and the distribution 
of earnings amongst the employed. It is improbable whether South Africa’s inequality could be 
brought down to ‘decent’ levels – at least to ‘normal’ standards of inequality internationally – 
without increased demand for low- and semi-skilled labour, as well as through a closing of wage 
gaps. 
 
Appendix 1: Processing of LFS data 
The empirical analysis of earnings inequality was undertaken using the fourteen full 
datasets of the Labour Force Survey (LFS), February 2001–September 2007. The LFS is 
conducted biannually by Statistics South Africa through visits to households, and observations 
are then weighted (using weights derived from the census) to obtain national figures. South 
Africa’s official labour market statistics are derived from the LFS.16  
Below we summarise some of the elements of the processing of the original LFS datasets 
that was implemented in advance of the quantitative analysis.  
Screening of high incomes 
Analyses of income distribution are sensitive to very high incomes. However, it is well 
known that incomes at the top end of the distribution tend to be disproportionately underreported 
in surveys, and hence it is likely that high-end incomes are actually underestimated. 
Nevertheless, high earnings were screened for observations which seemed clearly erroneous. 15 
original observations, which would have been weighted to 7 438 cases, were excluded on the 
grounds of their unrealistically high reported earnings, particularly in the light of the occupations 
and other personal characteristics of the respondents.  
                                                 
16 For this study, the original datasets were accessed through the South African Data Archive of the National 
Research Foundation. 
30 
 
Treatment of zero incomes 
At the other end of the distribution spectrum, about 10% of respondents who are classified 
as employed report zero earnings. These are not people who declined to report their earnings 
(which is also an option in the questionnaire) but people who specifically reported zero earnings.  
To some extent this is likely to derive from the expansive definition of employment used 
by Stats SA. A person need only have ‘worked’ for an hour in the previous week to be classified 
as employed. Further, this ‘work’ includes activities such as helping unpaid in a household 
business of any kind; doing any work on the household’s land or looking after animals; doing 
any construction or major repair work on their home, plot, cattle post or business; or catching 
animals for household food. Counting such activities as employment clearly means that some 
people who are classified as employed will have zero earnings. Further, there is a significant 
proportion of people earning positive incomes not much higher than zero. 
There are still likely to be a number of earnings that are erroneously reported as zero. 
However, there is no reliable way to discern which these would be. To simply delete everyone 
reporting zero earnings, as some studies on distribution in South Africa have done, would be to 
introduce a huge bias into the distribution by essentially cutting off the bottom end of the 
distribution. 
We have thus left all reported zero earnings in the sample, although have computed certain 
measures with and without these observations for comparison purposes. Certain of the measures 
and decompositions of inequality used cannot be computed with zero incomes, and for those 
purposes we imputed nominal earnings of R0.01 per month where zero earnings were reported. 
This does not affect the measures of distribution at the decimal places reported here.  
Treatment of earnings reported in brackets 
While respondents were asked to state their actual earnings, those unwilling or unable to do 
so were also given the option of indicating which of fourteen brackets their income falls within. 
This poses a problem for computations requiring income as a continuous variable.  
In a number of South African studies this was addressed through imputing the midpoint of 
the bracket to those in that bracket. However, a limitation of this approach is that the midpoint is 
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an inaccurate indicator of incomes in any given bracket, and for high brackets in particular is 
likely to underestimate the incomes of the bracket. Incomes in the highest bracket (R30 000 
upwards per month) have in other studies been simply assigned the bottom floor of the bracket, 
which clearly leads to an underestimation of those incomes. We took an alternative approach to 
the imputation of incomes to bracket respondents, calculating the mean and median incomes of 
people who reported actual incomes, by bracket, for each year. These were then assigned to the 
people in the same bracket who simply identified a bracket.  
This yielded two alternative measures. In the measure utilising mean incomes, the addition 
of the bracket-reporters with their imputed income obviously does not affect the mean income 
within each bracket, but it does affect the number and distribution of people within each bracket 
(and overall income distribution measures). In the measure utilising median incomes, the bracket 
median does not change but the mean does change somewhat, once those respondents who 
reported their incomes in brackets are added in. The empirical analysis was undertaken using 
both, to ensure the robustness of the results. The measure using the mean bracket incomes 
generally yields slightly indicators of inequality than does the measure using medians.  
Appendix 2: Equivalence scaling 
Three alternative equivalence methods of scaling household income and expenditure into 
per capita equivalents are used here. 
The simplest method is simply to divide the household total by the number of members of 
the household, referred to here as E1 scaling. This is the method using by Stats SA. In this 
equivalence scaling, 
sE =1  where s is the number of members of the household. 
This method assumes there are no economies of scale in household costs, and it also takes 
no account of the varying costs for different types of household members (such as an infant or 
adult). These limitations are addressed in the other two methods used here. 
In what we term E2 scaling,  
θη )(2 KA ssE +=  where: 
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As is the number of adults in the household and Ks is the number of children; 
η  is the adult equivalent of a child; and 
θ  is the scaling factor for household economies of scale. 
  
Thus 21 EE =  for 1=η  and 1=θ . 
The parameters which we use are 5.0=η  and 9.0=θ . These are in line with those used in 
the international literature, as well as those used in the South African context (see for example 
Woolard and Leibbrandt 2006). 
The third equivalence scaling used is the McClements equivalence scale, referred to here 
as E3. This takes account not only of how many adults and children there are in the household, 
but also the ages of the children. The parameters of the scaling used here are adapted from 
Lambert (2001) and in line with those used internationally. A limitation in this respect is that 
they are not based on empirical evidence of the costs faced by different age categories in the 
specific South African context, as there is no suitable existing evidence in this regard. 
The household scaling factor is calculated under this scale as follows: 
∑= s
i
iE λ3  for all s  members of the household, where: 
 61.0=iλ  for the first adult (where ‘adult’ is aged 20 years or over); 
 39.0=iλ  for the second adult; 
 46.0=iλ  for the third adult; 
 36.0=iλ  for subsequent adults; 
 135.0=iλ  for each member aged 0-4 years; 
 22.0=iλ  for each member aged 5-9 years; 
 25.0=iλ  for each member aged 10-14 years;   
 35.0=iλ  for each member aged 15-19 years; and 
3858.0=iλ  for each member that did not report their age. 
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